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I

became interested in congestion charging as
a policy ‘stick’ —the kind of policy that comple
ments policy ‘carrots’ like great bike, pedestrian
and transit infrastructure, and can make them
much more effective as part of a sustainable trans
portation strategy. Congestion charging is a meth
od of influencing travel behavior using pricing.
During peak congestion hours in London, vehicles
are charged a daily fee of £11.50 (roughly $19), to
enter the central business district. The policy was
adopted in 2003 to deter private vehicle trips and
encourage people to travel by other modes. It has
been highly effective.
There are a few examples of congestion charging in Califor
nia, such as the Bay Bridge in San Francisco, where drivers are
charged a higher price to cross the bridge during peak hours,
or tolled express lanes on I-10 and I-110 in Los Angeles, where
drivers can opt to pay a fee to use express lanes otherwise
reserved for high occupancy vehicles. These are examples
of managing peak demand in a single corridor. In London,
the congestion charge is applied to all roads in a central area
of about four square miles, to manage demand for driving
throughout that area. It is also in effect for the entire business
day, from 7:00 am until 6:00 pm. The charge is enforced by a
ring of cameras that match the license plates of cars entering
the charged area with a list of payments.
London is one of a handful of cities in the whole world that
has actually implemented a (citywide) congestion charging
scheme because they tend to be unpopular in places where
a lot of people drive. The most famous example is Singapore.
In London, only about 10% of people were commuting by car
when the congestion charge went into effect in 2003, which
helped make it less controversial. Public support was won over
by dedicating all revenues raised from the congestion charge
to public transportation improvements. The congestion charge
nets about £130 million ($200 million) per year, most of which is
invested in bus services ( Transport for London, 2008).

I am convinced, after having lived in London for
a year, and interviewed dozens of experts there,
that sustainable transportation policies need to
work together. London set mode shift as an ex
plicit policy goal, and implemented an aggres
sive combination of measures to get there. What
we have in London is a great case example of
mode shift at scale. The lesson learned is that you
cannot reduce vehicle miles travelled ( VMT ) and
achieve mode shift by doing one disparate thing
at a time. You need to do a lot of things simulta
neously, linked together, and they incrementally
add up to big changes.
A long-term trend of mode shift
The impacts of London’s congestion charge policy have been
well documented. The congestion charge area was expanded in
2008 to include a ‘western extension’ area, but this was removed
in response to residents’ complaints in 2011. The central charged
area has become part of the city fabric, and is not controversial
today (Figure 1). When it was introduced, the fee was £5, but it
is currently £11.50 (about $19.50). The increases were necessary
both to cover the cost of the expansion, and to remain competi
tive with public transit fares, which have also been increasing.
There are exemptions for low emission vehicles and disabled
drivers, and a fleet discount for freight vehicles. Traffic volumes
fell by an estimated 80,000 vehicles per day (20%) within the
central area when it was implemented, and have remained sta
ble over the decade ( Transport for London, 2013). Transit use in
creased 14% in the first year and has continued increasing over
the decade (Transport for London, 2008). A bicycling renais
sance is underway, and the number of people entering central
London by bike has doubled since 2003 (Transport for London,
2013). New pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure has been built
and pedestrian injuries and fatalities have decreased.
My study looks at how central London has been changing over
the past 20 years, in terms of population, employment, land

Special

12 ■

■ FOCUS 11

use, and travel behavior. There was steady population growth
from 1993 when the city had 6.8 million residents until 2013
when it had 8.5 million (21% growth) ( Transport for London,
2013). Employment growth, while cyclical, also trended steadi
ly upward, from 3.8 million jobs in 1993 to 5.2 million in 2013
(37% increase) (Transport for London, 2013). Both of these
factors drove growth in travel. The estimated average daily
number of trips made by Londoners grew from 20.8 million to
25.9 million (25% increase) over this timeframe ( Transport for
London, 2013).
The impacts of the congestion charge were most noticeable in
central London. Figure 2 shows trips entering central London
during the weekday morning peak from 1996 to 2009, by mode.
The number of people entering central London grew from
993,000 to 1.1 million over this timeframe (10% increase) (Trans
port for London, 2010). The proportion using a car was stable
until the early 2000s, when it began to decline and bus rider
ship began to increase. By 2003, when the congestion charge
was introduced, car commuting had already fallen substantially,
and more people bus riders exceeded drivers for the first time.
Behavioral change, especially of people switching out of cars,
accounted for a significant portion of the mode shift trend.
Table 1 shows a calculation of the changes in the number of
people commuting by public transit and private auto from
1996 to 2002, and from 2002 to 2009. These can be considered
pre- and post-congestion charging periods. Between 1996
and 2002, 75,000 people entered the workforce commuted
to central London. Yet the number of people commuting by
public transit increased by 119,000. So if we assume that all
the new commuters took transit, that means approximately
44,000 people (the difference) must have switched modes. This
seems to be explained by noticing that 34,000 fewer people
were commuting by car, 12,000 fewer by taxi, which adds up to
46,000 fewer people using those modes. Accounting for 2,000
additional bicycle commuters, that leaves 44,000 people who
switched out of cars and taxis onto public transit.
A similar calculation may be done for the change from 2002 to
2009, but in this case people were clearly switching to bicycles

Figure 2: Trend of people entering
central London, weekday morning
peak (in thousands; 1996 = 100).
From Transport for London, 2010.

Figure 1: The congestion charge boundary on Euston Road,
where two of six lanes are dedicated for bus priority.

as well. In this case, assuming all new commuters were transit
riders, 21,000 people must have switched out of cars to transit
(as no more switched away from taxis). The remaining 15,000
switched from cars to bikes, with some rounding errors. Table 1
reveals that the congestion charge was not the original impe
tus for people switching modes in central London. It came into
effect during a period when people were already switching to
transit in droves, and served to continue the trend.
How was mode shift achieved?
Why were people abandoning their car for commuting in the
pre-congestion charge period? Congestion was worsening
in central London throughout the 1990s, which is the main
reason that the idea of congestion charging arose. Increasing
traffic congestion was making cars and taxis inefficient and
unreliable. In 1997, the average travel speed in central London
during the morning peak was 15.2 kilometers per hour (9.4
mph), and by 2002 it had slowed to 14.2 kilometers per hour
on average (8.8 mph) (Transport for London, 2003).
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Public
transit

Private
auto

1996

800

154

Taxi

Bicycle

Total
commuters

29

10

993

2002

919

120

17

12

1,068

Change

119

-34

-12

2

75

2009

968

85

17

27

1,096

Change

49

-35

0

15

28

Table 1: Change in number of people commuting by public transit
and private auto (thousands). From Transport for London, 2010.

Starting in 1997, when a pro-transit national government came
to power in the UK, investment in transit increased dramatically.
This was a complete turnaround from previous decades of
neglect, during which London’s transit system was fragmented
and deteriorating. From 1997 to 2012, London added four new
extensions to its Docklands Light Rail (DLR) system, extended
the Jubilee line of the Underground, and built a new suburban
tram system called Croydon Tramlink. From 2007 to 2012, major
upgrades were made to the city’s commuter rail network,
including extensions to form a new orbital service called the
Overground. Massive investments were made to improve the
quality and reliability of the bus network. Over 26 kilometers
(16 miles) of bus priority lanes were installed by reallocating
roadspace on major arterial roads leading to central London,
and throughout the central business district.* In 1997, 337
million bus kilometers of service were operated in London. By
2003, there were 437 million bus kilometers of service (34%
increase), and in 2009, 483 million (Transport for London,
20010; 2013). Some of these expanded service kilometers were
new bus routes, but mainly they were increased frequencies
and longer service hours on existing routes. By 2009, nearly 100
of London’s 700 bus routes were running 24 hours per day.*
Transit ridership grew as capacity expanded, increasing the
reach of rail and bus networks and therefore the catchment area
for new passengers. But quality upgrades to vehicles, stations
and bus stops also attracted new riders out of choice. Over 200
stations were refurbished to relieve overcrowding and improve
disabled access and bicycle parking, and over 7,000 bus stops
were upgraded with lighting ( Transport for London, 2005). A
major communications campaign called Legible London in
stalled new wayfinding signage at all rail stations, bus stops,
and major intersections. The signs all follow the same design
and give information about the route and frequency of service,
as well as maps of the local area. In 2003, a smartcard ticketing
system was launched, the Oyster card. Smartcard readers were
installed in all Underground stations and buses, significantly
reducing boarding times and easing transfers.

1

Personal Communication. John Barry, Head of Bus Network Devel
opment. London, 2014.
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From 2005 to 2010, over £200 million was invested in walking
and cycling improvements throughout London (Transport
for London, 2005). In central London, traffic signals were retimed to favor pedestrian crossings over traffic throughput.
In 2008, a bicycle share system was launched, boosting the
trend of commuting by bike. High volume tourist areas such
as Trafalgar Square and Exhibition Road were redesigned to
enhance pedestrian comfort and safety. In contrast to the
systemic overhaul and consistent design which characterized
transit system improvements, many bicycle and pedestrian
infrastructure enhancements were experimental in nature.
A visitor biking around London will find a variety of designs for
bike lanes, signalized crossings, and parking in use. Transport
planners monitor use patterns and user feedback. For instance,
in the early 2000s, a network of blue bicycle lanes were painted
on high-volume arterial roads. Called ‘Cycle Superhighways’,
the idea was to give cyclists capacity on high speed routes,
allowing them to cut through London’s Victorian tangle of
side streets. However, the blue paint was not well respected
by drivers and cyclists using the lanes complained about
contending with parked cars, leapfrogging buses, and sudden
turns by cars. Therefore in 2014, a new generation of cycle
superhighways was unveiled (Figure 3).
Lessons learned from the London experience
An important caveat to keep in mind, when thinking about
whether these sort of effects could be achieved by similar policy
interventions in other cities, is that London is an ancient city
with good bones to build on. Its core, inside the charged area,
still has pedestrian-scale streets laid out by the Romans 2,000
years ago and during medieval times. During the Victorian era,
a dense railway network was developed, including fifteen rail
stations and the first ten lines of the Underground system. These
stations and right of ways have been in near-constant use, or
redeveloped to meet changing needs, over the past 150 years.
London’s highly transit accessible center helped it develop into
a monocentric city where employment is concentrated in the
central business district. So we are at a disadvantage in a lot
Figure 3: Near Stratford, the newest generation of bicycle
superhighways segregate bicycle and bus traffic.
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of the American cities that we work in, where high capacity
public transportation infrastructure is lacking.
Another important caveat is London’s regional approach to
transportation. Since 2000, London has had a regional agen
cy, Transport for London ( TfL), which is responsible the entire
public transportation system and a strategic regional network
of arterial roadways. It is an integrated, powerful agency that
owns and manages all rail, Underground, bus and taxi ser
vices in the 600 square mile London region. This change in
governance structure made transit system integration, repair
and modernization possible. It enabled a systemic approach,
meaning transit network capacity could be improved quickly
and at scale. TfL is headed by a directly elected Mayor who has
executive authority over the agency. This means an elected of
ficial who is directly accountable to the public for transporta
tion outcomes. Maintaining high levels of customer satisfac
tion with public transportation is a key part of retaining the
office. Therefore the Mayor’s office engages in frequent public
outreach and polling. This combination of centralized author
ity and visible accountability helps ensure that service levels
are equitable throughout the region, rather than varying based
upon the economic status and political will of each locality.

Figure 4: In Notting Hill, a street was closed to divert traffic and
create a pedestrian plaza with a bikeshare station. The sign is an
example of the Legible London wayfinding system.

I think there are a few lessons from the London experience that
are relevant for American transportation planners. First, setting
mode shift as an explicit policy goal and using paired carrot and
stick measures to achieve it. In the US we are often reluctant to
say that getting people out of cars is a policy goal, and we use
measures that reduce capacity for private autos, like realloca
tion of roadspace or pricing, very sparingly. When used, they
are deployed on a small scale for discrete projects. London’s
example shows the value of engaging in public debate about
priorities. It shows that utilizing a combination of measures, es
pecially linking them together, can be effective in winning pub
lic support and legitimize more controversial measures.

a variety of designs and monitoring use patterns and user
feedback has allowed transport planners to rip out the facilities
that do not work and scale up the ones that do. Planning for
bicycles in urban areas is a young field, and I think we need some
way to learn what works. Experimentation can be problematic in
the United States, where traffic engineers are held liable for their
designs. Some cities where bicycling is growing rapidly, like San
Francisco and New York, have managed to experiment with new
bicycle and pedestrian designs as pilot projects. I hope we will
see that kind of experimentation spread to more cities.

Another lesson learned is about the power of quality improve
ments to attract new transit riders. Measures like increased
frequencies and service hours, refurbished stations and stops,
and new vehicles were powerful attractors of choice riders in
London. Communication strategies like Legible London and
smartphone-friendly route planners made the transition easier
for people. Clearly, this was only achievable in London after a
pro-transit government came to power at the national level.
However, in the United States we have more locally-controlled
sources of funding that could be used to upgrade transit to be
more reliable, comfortable, and smartphone-compatible. One
step that TfL took to improve communications was free: data
feeds are published online for developers to use and develop
apps like route planners (also known as Application Program
ming Interface specifications, APIs). Some Uinted States transit
operators have begun to do this, and I think we should see more.

The aim of my talk here at San Luis Obispo today was to tell
you a little bit about what’s going on over in London, and to
inspire you. Mode shift on a large scale is possible. Urban ar
eas are growing, demographics are changing, and people are
less interested in being stuck in cars. The future looks bright for
planners interested in sustainable transportation.

Finally, London’s willingness to experiment has helped it
remain nimble and responsive to rapidly changing conditions
as volumes of bicyclists and pedestrians increase. Installing

Conclusion
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